Abstract. This 
Introduction
The effort of the research described in this paper was to implement a working multilevel-secure database prototype. Multilevel Secure (MLS) models are based on the classification of the system elements, where classifications are expressed by security levels. Data objects have security levels and users have clearance levels. As an example, we can have three possible security levels S-Secret, C-Classified, and UUnclassified, where S is a higher classification than C and U, and C is a higher classification than U. A security (or clearance) level l1 dominates another level l2 (stated as l1 ≥ l2), if l1 is higher than or on the same level as l2 in the partial (or total) order of security levels. For example, S ≥ C ≥ U. According to the BellLaPadula [1] simple property, a subject (user) can read a certain object (data) only if the subject's clearance level dominates the object's security level. In other words, a subject cannot read an object at a higher or incomparable security level than the subject. Many MLS relational database models have been proposed. Early work in MLS relational databases was focused on the semantics and the relational algebra for MLS models. The SeaView model [2] was the first formal MLS secure relational database designed to provide mandatory security protection. The Sea View model extended the concept of a database relation to include the security labels. A relation that is extended with security classifications is called a multilevel relation. The Jajodia-Sandhu model [4] was derived from the SeaView model. It was shown that the SeaView model can result in the proliferation of tuples on updates [3] and the Jajodia-Sandhu model addressed this shortcoming. The Smith-Winslett model [7] was the first model to extensively address the semantics of an MLS database. In was shown that all of the aforementioned models can present users with some information that is difficult to interpret [5] . Consequently, the BCMLS model (thoroughly described in [6] ) addressed those concerns by including the semantics for an unambiguous interpretation of all data presented to the users.
Due to its comprehensive semantics, we have chosen the BCMLS model as a basis for our prototype 1 . Table 1 shows a typical structure of an  BCMLS table. A security label contains a list of levels. These labels provide a user with a comprehensive interpretation of every part of every visible tuple. Primary level of each label is a security level where the value is inserted into the database. In every security label, the first letter represents its primary level. Remaining letters are called secondary levels and indicate the (dis)beliefs of upper level users. If a false tuple doesn't correspond to any real world entity in the belief of higher level user, such tuple represents a mirage tuple for the higher level user.
Implementation: Basics
The entity identifier for the relation shown in Table 1 is: Vessel + Vessel Class. That means that, for instance "Enterprise C" and "Enterprise U" are two different ships.
The Table 1 presents the entire relation, which is at the same time the S-level user view. Table 2 shows the C-level user view and Table 3 shows the U-level user view. The U-level user view shows no classification labels because Ulevel users should not even know that they are working with a multilevel database. 
Implementation: Views
One of the main tasks that the system based on the BCMLS model must support is to present to the users on different security levels only parts of security labels that those users have right to see. Let us take an example of security label: U-CS • U-level user can see: U (in fact U-level user in our implementation does not see any security label -in his world there is no multilevel database) • C-level user can see: U-C • S-level user can see: U-CS Obviously, we need a function that will return a part of security label according to the user level. In our prototype, we used a numerical system with base 3. For example, C level is accounted for in a label as follows:
• C = 2 (true)
• absence of C in the label = 0 (irrelevant)
One security label consists of U-level data, Clevel data and S-level data. For example, UCS security label would be represented as 222.
Combining with a numerical system with base 3 we have:
Some other examples:
U-CS = 212 = 2 + 1*3 + 2*9 = 23 U-S = 201 = 2 + 0*3 + 1*9 = 11
The complete security label is represented with one integer. Simple mathematical operation can break that integer number into individual parts of the multi-level security label. This is done using simple division and modulo function. The following code determines the composition of the label. In our prototype, we maintain a system table (shown as Table 4 ) that contains information about the users and their security levels. The values for column ul are from the domain integer ≥ 1 (U=1, C=2, S=3 …) 
procedure pl(L) { break levels into parts; return the first part that has a value 2; } 2. sl(L): extracts and returns secondary levels of security label L sl function only indicates if belief on some level exists, it doesn't reveal if it's a true or false. In the second example above it doesn't matter if L=C-S or L=CS. The result would be the same. Examples:
procedure sl(L) { break levels into parts; exclude primary level; return the rest; } 3. lb(c,L): extracts and returns the belief of a user from the security level c about information labeled by the label L. Our procedure takes only one argument: security label. User level is extracted from the system table 'Users' inside the procedure. Examples:
procedure lb(L) { break levels into parts; get user security level; i=1;
In our implementation we were driven by the idea to build as much as possible by using DBMS mechanisms, through stored procedures and triggers. Consequently, the client software should only take parts that cannot be implemented with the DBMS facilities.
After implementing the basic functions as shown above, the next task was to build appropriate views of MLS database relation. Considering the fact that U-level user must not be aware of MLS database at all, we had to build two views: one for U-level user and other for higher level users who should see part of security labels on their own and on levels below. Tables 5, 6 , and 7. Table 5 represents S-level view, Table 6 represents C-level view, while Table 7 represents U-level view. 
Implementation: Insert
The insert is implemented through stored procedure. The procedure takes attributes as arguments, calculate value of security label and insert a complete tuple into the table.
For instance, assume that C-level user wants to insert the following data:
INSERT INTO starship VALUES("Enterprise", "Roumulus", "Trading");
This query would suit a regular relational database. However, in our MLS database this opeartion calls the following procedure:
EXECUTE PROCEDURE sinsert ("Enterprise", "Roumulus", "Trading");
The procedure calculates value for security labels (for C-level user it would be: 0 + 2*3 + 0*9 = 6) and execute following query:
INSERT INTO starship VALUES("Enterprise", 6, "Roumulus", 6, "Trading", 6, 6, 0);
Implementation: Verify
Verification can be explicit (by using a command) or implicit (consequence of some other action such as delete procedure the tuple must not be deleted because the C and S-level users have set their belief onto that tuple. Instead of deleting, the verify procedure will be executed. The tuple will be unverified on Ulevel. The flag will be set for C and S-level users that indicate that the original tuple is deleted and that they have to explicitly decide what to do with that tuple. The S-level view of the relation is represented in Table 8 . 
CS
The value CS in the flag attribute for the middle tuple indicates, to both C and S level users (the flag would be seen as C only on C-level) that they can either delete this tuple (in effect accept the delete from the U-level) or re-verify this tuple as true. The U-level view of the database after the 'delete' is shown into table 9. The logic behind the flag value (which is also an integer) is similar to the logic developed for the tuple classification. If lb(flag)=1, then the flag is set. That means that a user on that level must explicitly decide what to do with the belief on that tuple, because the tuple has changed or has been deleted.
The user can delete tuple only if pl(tc)=c where c is user level that executed the delete procedure.
Otherwise, the delete will be rejected.
The delete procedure has some additional after-delete effects. After the delete, is done, the unverify procedure is executed for all tuples with the same EID (K+KC) as the deleted tuple, having lb(tc)=1 (belief: false). Since these were cover stories and they must be unverified after the true story they represent is deleted. < , the user will choose a tuple u t from among all i t 's (including t), and a new tuple t n based on tu will be inserted on the c level, while the attribute values of t u itself will not change. Our version of the described UPDATE procedure is developed using stored procedures and triggers in combination with a PHP code. This code, in essence, represents a middleware. Its purpose is to provide convenience for further programming. It enables the call of functions for update with right arguments; and then it checks the conditions, prepares the query and executes it. All sensitive code is kept in one library (DLL in windows world). The programmers of client applications can use these functions without knowing their structure. This has two major advantages. First, is easier programming for the application code programmers. The second one is related to a security issue. These functions can reveal sensitive information about inner structure of MLS database and because of that, it is a good idea to cloak them. This is convenient for the development of client-server applications, where sensitive code can be put into the a middleware layer, along with access lists which control the possibility of deleting and verifying tuples for a specific user.
Conclusions and Future Work
The semantic completeness of BCMLS makes it powerful enough to withstand any demand that can be put on MLS database system today.
Its implementation is relatively complicated but accomplishable, as we illustrated with our prototype. Significant amount of work has to be done on server side and client side in order for this model to work in real life. Aside from the performance loss due to the additional control operations and verifications, the major issue is the additional changing the database structure.
More work has to be done in order to make this model attractive for commercial purposes. There is some amount of automatic verification processing in the background and (as our future project) we will perform an analysis on the possible performance loss due to these and other operations (such as converting integer labels into character strings).
We will simulate MLS databases with hundreds of tables. In such environment it will be interesting to estimate the price of join, update and delete and to see how much of CPU time has to be spent on maintenance of the consistency of the entire visible world.
The other issue that will have to be considered is possibility of changing the structure of such MLS databases after they have been put into production state. The implementation has to support the changes to the database structure in production state, so the whole model does not have to be table-structure dependant.
There are two ways of accomplishing that: 1. To construct the tool that will allow modifications to the MLS database as if it is the regular relational database. Such tool would translate user's modifications into the MLS world. The user is involved in specific MLS issues as little as possible. 2. To make all database design on regular relational database. After the construction or modifications are complete, the tool translates the model into the MLS world.
The first method is conceptually better because it is easier to make changes to the production-state databases.
